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Abstract  This paper offers a brief analysis of the legal aspects of the ethnic return 
migration policy of Kazakhstan, a post-Soviet Central Asian state that has been 
active in seeking ties with its diaspora since independence. This paper examines the 
definition of oralman (repatriates) and the establishment of a quota on the number of 
Kazakh immigrants who are eligible for government funds to show how the rationale 
and preferences in repatriation policy have changed over the years. By focusing on 
changes in migration-related legislation in the late 2000s and early 2010s, the paper 
notes that two key goals of Kazakhstan’s migration policy are not necessarily 
consistent with each other: the promotion of an ethnically based nation-building 
project by encouraging the “return” of co-ethnics living abroad, and building a 
workforce that is best suited for the development of the state’s economy. 
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The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union brought 
both the reunion and division of ethnic communities residing within and beyond the 
borders of the Soviet state. On the one hand, ethnic groups within the Soviet territory 
came into long-awaited contact with their co-ethnics abroad, from whom they had been 
separated for decades. On the other, the borders between nominally sovereign Soviet 
republics turned into international borders, and persons who were not living in “their 
own” ethno-national republic suddenly found themselves on the “wrong” side of the 
border.  
Kazakhstan is one of a few post-Soviet republics that have been keen to seek 
contact with its diaspora. Since the last years of the Soviet era when “repatriation” of 
ethnic Kazakhs began, according to official statistics, more than 860,000 Kazakhs have 
moved to Kazakhstan, mostly from neighboring states such as Uzbekistan, Mongolia, 
China, and Turkmenistan.1 With a total population of 16 million and 10.1 million 
Kazakhs in Kazakhstan (the 2009 national census), these “repatriates” (oralman) form 
an essential part of contemporary Kazakhstani society and the Kazakh community in 
particular.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s political elites sought to build a 
state truly of and for the titular ethnicity by urging Kazakhs abroad to “come back home” 
and granting them full citizenship of the newly independent state. The aim of this policy 
was to overcome negative legacies created under the Soviet regime, namely: the 
minority status of the Kazakhs in Kazakhstan and the linguistic as well as cultural 
russification (though in some aspects, it may be more precise to say sovietization) 
among the Kazakhs themselves. The “homecoming” of Kazakhs from abroad was 
expected to contribute to the growth of the Kazakh population, which had declined 
sharply in the 1930s because of death and out-migration caused by forced 
sedentarization, mass collectivization, and famine. It was also hoped that the oralman 
would promote a revival of the Kazakh language and culture, as the Kazakhs in the 
diaspora, in particular those in the “far abroad,” were not affected by the strong trend 
toward russification and thus were in a relatively better position to maintain their 
ethno-cultural characteristics. 
In independent Kazakhstan, the relevancy of the migration policy encouraging the 
return of Kazakhs to their ethnic homeland has rarely been questioned. The inclusion of 
foreign or stateless ethnic Kazakhs into Kazakhstani society was placed as part and 
                                                   
1 According to a report by the Commission on Human Rights under the President of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan (2012), 860,400 Kazakh individuals, or 221,300 households, 
immigrated to Kazakhstan from 1991 until October 1, 2011. Of this amount, 127,700 
households (57.7% of total) were provided assistance under the quota.  
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parcel of the state’s nation-building project, and thus was politically justified. Also, 
unlike in the cases of other states that have promoted the homecoming of the diaspora, 
repatriating Kazakhs from abroad are not necessarily viewed as having lost their ethnic 
purity. Indeed, it is the local Kazakhs, many of whom are linguistically and culturally 
russified to varying degrees, who are considered by repatriates as having lost contact 
with their ethnic and cultural past. 
Nevertheless, social integration of Kazakh immigrants is indeed a serious challenge 
for Kazakhstan. While some managed to adapt to the local community and successfully 
started new careers, a majority of them have faced serious problems in areas such as 
housing, employment, and education of children. Despite publicly expressed—and 
politically correct—support for the solidarity of the Kazakh nation, local people do not 
necessarily welcome their co-ethnics at any cost. A recent analysis of public discourse on 
the issue of Kazakh return migration shows that the open-arm welcome and initial 
excitement toward returning Kazakhs have been replaced by warnings that repatriates 
should not expect too much from the state. Increasingly, Kazakh elites now emphasize 
that repatriates should contribute to the homeland instead of becoming a burden 
(Bonnenfant 2012). 
This paper is a brief analysis of the legal aspects of the repatriation policy of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. In particular, it examines the definition of oralman 
(repatriates) and the establishment of quotas on the number of Kazakh immigrants who 
are eligible for government funds to show how the rationale and preferences in return 
migration policy have changed over the years. By focusing on changes in migration 
related legislation in the late 2000s and the early 2010s, the paper notes the dilemma of 
pursuing purposes that are not necessarily consistent with each other: promotion of an 
ethnically based nation-building project that encourages the return of co-ethnics living 
abroad and building a workforce that is best suited for the development of state’s 
economy.  
 
Who are to be invited to “home”? 
According to Tsuda (2009), more than 20 countries sponsor ethnic return migration in 
the world, with the specific reasons and purposes behind such policy differing by region. 
Broadly speaking, ethnic preferences in immigration policy and citizenship law in 
European countries and Israel are based on the idea that state has responsibility for or 
obligation to their co-ethnics abroad, who are considered as an integral part of the 
de-territorialized ethnic nation. As such, members of diaspora are essentially granted 
the right to return to their homeland. In contrast, in East and Southeast Asian 
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countries (including Japan) members of the diaspora are expected, first and foremost, to 
make an economic contribution to their homeland by providing labor, professional skills, 
or investment. This difference is reflected in the legal status of immigrants: while most 
European states and Israel grant co-ethnic immigrants citizenship upon return, or 
allow them to recover the citizenship of ethnic homeland and become dual nationals, 
Asian states usually limit the mode of immigration to preferential visas for the ethnic 
brethren. 
Kazakhstan’s migration and citizenship policies are based on its self-definition as 
the one and only ethnic center for Kazakhs in the world. The policies also seek to restore 
historical justice for those who were forced to leave homeland under “colonial” rule and 
their descendants. Kazakhstan’s state-sponsored repatriation program most resembles 
the prototypical ethnic return migration policies of Israel. Both Kazakhstan and Israel 
accept co-ethnics solely on the basis of ethnicity without setting other conditions such as 
language proficiency or country of residence. As stated below, however, in recent years 
more emphasis has begun to be placed on the possible economic contribution by Kazakh 
immigrants to homeland rather than the state’s obligation toward them. 
Next we outline the changes in the definition of the target of ethnic return 
migration in the official documents. 2 The 1993 Constitution, the first adopted in 
independent Kazakhstan, allowed “all citizens of the republic who were forced to leave 
its territory, and all Kazakhs residing in other countries” to obtain Kazakhstan’s 
citizenship without relinquishing one’s current passport (Article 4). The 1995 
Constitution, however, denied dual citizenship without exception. Meanwhile, the 1992 
Migration Law conferred the rights of return to all “compatriots” (sootechestvenniki) 
residing abroad (Article 1). In this context, the term “compatriots” appears to apply to 
all of former citizens of Kazakhstan, including persons of non-Kazakh ethnicities.3 
Despite the formal bestowal of rights to repatriation on former citizens of 
Kazakhstan irrespective of ethnicity, these policies seem to have had little impact on 
non-Kazakhs. With massive out-migration from Kazakhstan in the 1990s, primarily of 
ethnic Russians and Germans, it was generally presumed that those who would return 
to Kazakhstan were Kazakhs. Thus, it is no surprise that the law was soon amended to 
specify that the ethnic background of returning immigrants must be Kazakh. Article 1 
                                                   
2 For a more detailed analysis of documents related to Kazakhstan’s ethnic return 
migration policy, see Oka (2010).  
3 Article 17.3 of the 1992 Migration Law defines “refugees-repatriates” 
(bezhentsy-repatrianty) as compatriots and (emphasis is mine) “persons of native 
nationality” (litsa korennoi natsional’nosti, i.e. Kazakhs) who left Kazakhstan because 
of mass repressions and other reasons, and come back to their homeland. This wording 
suggests that “compatriots” here includes both Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs.  
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of the 1997 Migration Law stated that a repatriate (repatriant in Russian, oralman in 
Kazakh) is “a person of native ethnicity (litso korennoi natsional'nosti) who was 
expelled from the historic homeland, deprived of citizenship due to the acts of mass 
political repressions, unlawful requisition, forced collectivization, and other inhumane 
acts, and voluntarily moves to the Republic of Kazakhstan for permanent residency, and 
his descendants.” 
The Migration Law Amendment of March 27, 2002, redefined the term oralman4 as 
“foreign or stateless citizens of Kazakh ethnicity, who permanently resided outside of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan when it obtained sovereignty, and have arrived in 
Kazakhstan for permanent residency.” Thus, the amended definition does not take into 
account whether an immigrant had lived in Kazakhstan in the past. We should note, 
however, that the change in the definition of oralman in the 2002 amendment did not 
affect migration trends, as the amendment did not so much change the migration policy 
itself as conform the law to actual practices. Even before 2002, Kazakh “repatriates” 
immigrating to Kazakhstan were not asked whether they or their ancestors had been 
deported from Kazakhstan.5 
Not all ethnic Kazakhs currently residing beyond the borders of the contemporary 
territory of Kazakhstan are former refugees (or their descendants) who fled homeland 
to avoid political turmoil, repression, and famine under the Tsarist or Soviet regime. 
There are also Kazakhs who had lived on their land outside of the current borders of 
Kazakhstan for generations, long before Soviet times. If the government had limited the 
right to “return” to only those who had had lived in Kazakhstan (if technically possible 
at all), a substantial number of ethnic Kazakhs abroad would have been denied such 
opportunity.  
The 2011 Migration Law stipulates that the ethnic affiliation of a claimant for the 
status of oralman is determined by the information in the person’s identification 
                                                   
4 Oralman means a repatriate in Kazakh. By this amendment, repatriant (repatriate in 
Russian) was replaced by oralman in the Russian text of the law.  
The 2011 Migration Law made the definition of oralman more rigorous. Article 1.13 
stipulates that an oralman is an ethnic Kazakh who permanently resided outside of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan when it obtained sovereignty as well as his children of Kazakh 
ethnicity who were born after the acquisition of the sovereignty by the republic, have 
moved to Kazakhstan for permanent residency, and obtained the status of oralman by 
the procedures established by law. “Ethnic Kazakhs” is defined by Article 1.28 as foreign 
or stateless citizens of Kazakh ethnicity permanently residing abroad.  
5 Commenting on this point, Bolat Tatibekov, an expert on migration issues in 
Kazakhstan, explained that it was practically impossible to check whether an 
immigrant (or his/her ancestors) had been forced to leave Kazakhstan in the past 
(interview, March 8, 2009).  
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document (Article 20.2 and Article 21.2). Judging from this provision alone, in order to 
become an oralman, a candidate must present an official document that certifies that 
the person is Kazakh.6 In the case of Israel, a well-known example of ethnic return 
migration, one is entitled to citizenship of the ancestral homeland if one of the 
grandparents is Jewish. This principle contributed to the diversification of the ethnic 
background of repatriates, which, in turn, raised the question in the local population, 
“Are they really our co-ethnics?” In Kazakhstan, there are reports that some 
non-Kazakh immigrants procured a certificate of oralman by presenting fabricated or 
illegally obtained documents. These unlawful cases aside, the “authenticity” of the 
ethnic background of Kazakh immigrants is rarely questioned.  
 
The quota system 
Kazakhstan in principle receives all Kazakhs who wish to move to their historical 
homeland, without setting a limit of the maximum number of acceptable immigrants. 
The government should, according to migration law and other related legal documents, 
provide citizenship and a variety of assistance to all Kazakh repatriates. In addition, a 
quota is set each year on the number of households entitled to financial benefits such as 
compensation for travel costs, financial assistance for obtaining housing, and one-time 
cash assistance.  
When the quota for Kazakh immigrants was introduced in 1993, 10,000 households 
were allocated funds for adaptation by the young state, which was struggling with 
severe economic crisis itself at that time. However, such a level of assistance could not 
be sustained and the government began to decrease the number of households eligible 
for assistance within the framework of the quota system to as low as 500 households in 
1999 and 2000. Afterward, likely because of the remarkable economic development of 
Kazakhstan, the quota was raised and has varied between 10,000 and 20,000 since 2004 
(Diener 2009: 227). 
If the quantity of the quota has continuously fluctuated since its introduction, a 
qualitative transformation was brought by the amendment to the Migration Law as of 
July 6, 2007, which stipulated that inclusion of Kazakh families into the quota system 
                                                   
6 In migration laws prior to 2011, no description was included that specified the 
procedures to determine ethnic background of repatriates. In my interviews with 
migration committee officials in Almaty (in October 2008) and Pavlodar and Shymkent 
(in December 2007), they testified that the ethnic affiliation of immigrants from the 
former Soviet republics and China was determined using the record of ethnicity in the 
identification documents issued by these countries. In other cases, the Embassy of 
Kazakhstan in each country checked ethnicity using a birth certificate or other 
documents.  
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was to be decided by “taking into account criteria” (s uchetom kriteriev) (Article 14.2). 
The 2007 amendment, however, did not specify the content of these criteria. Since 2008 
preferences in the quota system have been given to those with higher education and 
families having many children.  
Furthermore, in December 2008 the government adopted the Nurly Kosh (Bright 
Move) Program with the aim of properly situating immigrants (as well as internal 
migrants) in Kazakhstan and to address their problems in the spheres of employment 
and housing. It is worth pointing out that the program was targeted at not only ethnic 
Kazakhs but also former citizens of Kazakhstan, irrespective of ethnicity, who had left 
the country in the past and returned for the purpose of “carrying out working activities” 
(Section 1). These former citizens, together with Kazakh immigrants, are entitled to 
Kazakhstani citizenship (Section 5.3.2). By implementing this program, it was expected 
that the highly skilled workers who had previously left Kazakhstan would be 
encouraged to come back (Section 1). Also, all participants in the program were required 
to meet certain educational, qualification, and work criteria (Section 5.4).  
The trend toward placing greater importance on the skills of immigrants is clearly 
revealed in the Migration Law enacted in July 2011. This new migration law stipulates 
that the following categories of people are to be given preference in the quota for 
financial assistance for Kazakh immigrants (in descending order): (1) those with proper 
education, qualifications and experiences in a certain area of expertise; (2) families with 
many children; (3) adult youth who are able to study in institutions of higher education; 
and (4) immigrants from countries under unstable political, social, and economic 
conditions (Article 20.4). While categories of (2) and (4) are based on humanitarian 
grounds, the emphasis on professional skills (and the potential to learn such skills) 
suggest that 2011 Migration Law as a whole follows recent trends that attach more 
importance to the economic value of immigrants than to their ethnicity.  
The factors behind these changes are the diminished significance of the struggle for 
ethno-demographic superiority of Kazakhs and the growing demand for workers in 
Kazakhstan’s thriving economy. At the time of independence, the reestablishment of 
majority status of the core ethnicity was an important political agenda. However, 
large-scale out-migration of non-Kazakhs, primarily Russians and Germans, in the 
1990s brought victory for Kazakhs in the demographic competition by default. Also, the 
higher birthrate among Kazakhs than among Slavic communities means that 
demographic superiority of the former is almost guaranteed. Now, economic factors are 
more relevant than political ones in Kazakhstan’s migration policy: the government 
emphasizes the necessity of attracting highly skilled workers who are suited for its 
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industrial development policy.7  
As mentioned above, Kazakhstan’s migration policy resembles that of Israel as both 
states set a criterion for repatriates only on the basis of their ethnic background without 
linguistic or geographic conditions. In the early years of independence, Kazakhstan, as 
Israel did and continues to do so, sought to make use of its co-ethnics abroad as a 
demographic tool to increase the share of the core ethnicity. For Israel, constitutionally 
defined as a Jewish state, but with a growing Arab minority and surrounded by hostile 
Arab states, the maintenance and increase of the Jewish population is a critical security 
issue. Israel’s policies have not changed after the Cold War, even when religiously and 
culturally diverse immigrants of Jewish decent came en masse and calls for the revision 
of migration policy mounted.8 
In the meantime, the importance of demographic politics continues to diminish in 
Kazakhstan. The share of Kazakhs as a percentage of the total population of the 
republic (63.1% according to the 2009 national census) still falls below that of the 
Jewish population in Israel (75.6% according to the 2008 national census).9 However, 
Kazakhstan has managed to co-exist with neighboring states in peace, if not without 
conflict. With minority elites in Kazakhstan having been suppressed or put under 
control, there is little risk that they would serve foreign states as a “fifth column.” Thus, 
for Kazakhstan it is no longer necessary to give highest priority to the repatriation of 
co-ethnics as in the case of Israel.  
 
Revision of ethnic return migration policy after the Zhanaozen incident 
In April 2012, the Kazakhstan government decided to suspend the allocation of the 
quota for 2012 “until further order of the government.” 10 Although this does not 
necessarily mean the complete abolition of the quota system, there has been no move to 
resume the allocation of the quota as of the end of 2012. Commenting on the necessity of 
a new program targeted at Kazakh immigrants, Internal Affairs Minister 
Kalmukhanbet Kasymov stated that the government had lost track of immigrants 
                                                   
7 Low-skilled and unskilled jobs are increasingly fulfilled by migrant workers from 
neighboring Central Asian states, a majority of whom often work illegally in 
Kazakhstan because the procedure for obtaining a work permit is too complex, and also 
there are many ways to stay and work informally, evading the strict legal provisions 
(Dave: forthcoming).  
8 For more on the migration policy of Israel, see, for example, Joppke and Rosenhek 
(2009).  
9 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics [http://www1.cbs.gov.il/census/]. 
10 “V Kazakhstane priostanovlena kvota na immigratsiiu oralmanov,” 
[http://tengrinews.kz], April 23, 2012. 
8 
 
under the current scheme and implied that controls on them must be strengthened.11 
Indeed, cases of misuse of privileges intended for Kazakh immigrants who seek 
permanent residency in Kazakhstan have been reported. A typical pattern is that an 
immigrant acquires a Kazakhstani passport, receives government funds, and then 
returns to a previous country of residence. This problem, however, had been pointed out 
long before 2012. 
The decision to suspend the quota in 2012 appears to be related to a different 
factor—the tragic incident in Zhanaozen, a small city in the Mangistau oblast in oil-rich 
western Kazakhstan. On December 16, 2011, Kazakhstan’s Independence Day, clashes 
broke out between striking oil workers, police, and possibly others in the central square 
of the city, where official ceremonies were organized to commemorate Kazakhstan’s 20 
years of independence. Official reports state that civilians were fired on by local police 
and outside security personnel: 12 people were killed, with dozens more wounded, and 
three other people died in related violence. For several months prior to the tragedy, 
thousands of workers employed in oil and gas sector demanded higher wages and 
improved working conditions in three separate labor strikes against their employers. 
Without trying to resolve the disputes effectively, the oil companies dismissed hundreds 
of their employees who participated in the strikes, which only aggravated the 
grievances of the workers (Human Rights Watch 2012).  
The alleged relationship between this incident and Kazakh immigrants was most 
explicitly indicated by Timur Kulibaev, then the Chairman of the Board of the National 
Welfare Fund Samruk Kazyna which is the sole owner of the state oil and gas company 
KazMunaiGas, an important shareholder of two of the three companies affected by 
labor disputes. In September 2011, Kulibaev publicly stated that these strikes were 
plotted by oralman from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The oil workers who 
participated in the strikes in turn accused Kulibaev of defaming their dignity, while 
Kazakh nationalists attacked him for oralman-phobia.12 It is possible that there were 
some immigrants among the strikers, but Kulibaev’s statement was a clear 
exaggeration of their role in the labor disputes. However, Kulibaev was perhaps not 
completely wrong in saying that the government should limit immigration to Zhanaozen 
as the social infrastructure of the town was not suited to accept a large number of 
people. Indeed, the influx of immigrants appears to have been a serious burden for the 
local authorities. According to official statistics, every fifth resident of Mangistau oblast 
                                                   
11 “Novuiu programmu po pereseleniiu oralmanov razrabatyvaet MVD Kazakhstana – 
Kasymov,” [http://www.zakon.kz], April 25, 2012. 
12 “Timur Kulibaev nazval zabastovku neftianikov proiskami repatriantov,” 
[http://rus.azattyq.org], September 30, 2011.  
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is a Kazakh immigrant, which is the highest share of all regions in the republic.13  
On December 20, 2011, First Vice Prime Minister Umirzak Shukeev, who headed a 
government commission on the investigation of the incident, declared that no more 
immigrants would be settled in Zhanaozen, and referred to the possibility of moving 
those who had lived in the town to other areas of the republic.14 The subsequent 
reduction in the quota also appears to have been affected by the unrest in Zhanaozen: a 
resolution of December 22, 2011, cut the quota in half to 10,000 households for 2012; 
whereas from 2009 to 2011 the quota had previously been set at 20,000.15 As stated 
above, the allocation of the quota was completely suspended four months later.  
The measures taken by the government of Kazakhstan after the Zhanaozen tragedy 
revealed that it failed to create an effective scheme for utilizing labor and satisfying the 
needs of Kazakh immigrants, who were officially invited to come to their homeland. 
Needless to say, it is not only immigrants in Kazakhstan who face a variety of social and 
economic difficulties such as unemployment. In addition, the problems confronted by 
immigrants vary, depending on their professional skills, educational background, 
knowledge of the Russian or Kazakh language, kinship network, personal connections, 
the time of arrival, and other factors. In general, however, it is perhaps fair to say that, 
compared with the local population, immigrants generally encounter more difficulties.  
Kazakhstan has been promoting repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs under the slogan 
that it is the obligation of the state to grant its co-ethnics the right to return to their 
historical homeland. Yet at the same time, by failing to provide enough support for 
immigrants and making them feel abandoned by their homeland, the Kazakh 
government in fact continues to create people who are not necessarily loyal but rather 
disappointed with and critical of the government. On the other hand, the complete 
abandonment of the long-standing ethnic return migration policy would put the ruling 
elites in a difficult position, as such a change would mean that the state had moved 
away from its self-definition as an ethnic center for Kazakhs, which, in turn, would 
inevitably invite severe criticism from Kazakh nationalists and immigrants.  
                                                   
13 Mangistau oblast is now home to the third largest population of Kazakh immigrants 
after South Kazakhstan oblast and Almaty oblast. If we assume that all of the 
immigrants (107,500 persons) have settled in Mangistau oblast, their share amounts 
to 20.1% out of the whole oblast population. See Commission on Human Rights under 
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2012). 
14 “Programmu po rasseleniiu oralmanov v Zhanaozen sleduet ostanovit, schitaet 
Shukeev,” [http://www.zonakz.net], December 20, 2011. 
15 “V Kazakhstane priostanovlena kvota na immigratsiiu oralmanov,” 
[http://tengrinews.kz], April 23, 2012. This article says that the quota set in December 
2012 was meant for the years 2011-14, but it appears that it was for 2012-14. 
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A dilemma of ethnic migration policy 
Immigrants of Kazakh descent were expected to become politically and culturally ideal 
citizens of their ancestral homeland following Soviet rule. In practice, however, 
integration of Kazakh immigrants into the local community has not been easy, and their 
repatriation has created new divisions and exacerbated social problems in Kazakhstani 
society.  
Migration policy that encourages the return of co-ethnics, in particular, policies 
that provides citizenship and financial assistance to make repatriates a full-fledged 
member of the state (the Europe-Israel model noted above), typically encounter the 
following challenges from the receiving community. First, the local population often 
considers these immigrants as the “other” and “not authentic” co-ethnics, as those who 
have lived under the influence of different cultures for generations naturally adopt the 
dominant language and culture of the receiving community. Second, local residents tend 
to complain that they are treated unfairly in relation to immigrants, as the latter are 
allocated government funds for their needs. In the eyes of the locals, immigrants enjoy 
too many privileges that are not available to local taxpayers, and this feeling of 
unfairness is further strengthened by the belief that immigrants share ethnicity in 
name only. The third criticism comes from the point of view of minorities, non-co-ethnic 
immigrants, and civil liberty advocates who argue that the state should guarantee 
equal rights to all people irrespective of ethnicity, and thus should not privilege 
co-ethnic immigrants at the expense of others.16 
The complexity of the issue of cultural assimilation in Kazakhstan lies in the fact 
that both the Kazakh diaspora in foreign lands and also Kazakhs in their homeland 
during the 70 years of Soviet rule experienced linguistic and cultural transformation. 
For some Kazakhs, primarily in urban areas, Russian became their first language as 
they received education almost exclusively in Russian. This shift led to a linguistic and 
cultural cleavage between Russian-speaking and Kazakh-speaking Kazakhs (Dave 
2007).17 For the former, co-ethnic immigrants, in particular those from outside of the 
former Soviet Union, are the cultural “other,” and it is not easy to accept them as “us” on 
                                                   
16 In their comparative analysis of the cases of Israel and Germany, Joppke and 
Rosenhek (2009) categorized the first and second arguments as a “restrictive challenge” 
and the third as a “liberal challenge.”  
17 Needless to say, the Kazakh population cannot simply be divided into 
Kazakh-speaking and Russian-speaking. Many Kazakhs speak both languages, and the 
difference of individual language proficiency is great. Also, language proficiency does 
not necessarily correlate with ethnic identity: a Russian-speaking Kazakh may be an 
eager advocate of the Kazakh language and culture.  
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the ground of the shared ancestry. However, in the eyes of immigrants, even the rural 
Kazakh-speaking brethren are quite russified as they still cherish classic Soviet values 
such as “the friendship of peoples” and the “approach to the civilized world through the 
Russian language” (Sancak 2007). After encounters with such co-ethnics in their 
ancestral homeland, immigrants often boast that it is they who managed to sustain 
“genuine” Kazakhnesss (Diener 2009: 272-286). Such self-identification by immigrants, 
in turn, serves as a factor that alienates repatriates from the locals.  
In addition to the conflict over Kazakhness, the sense of unfairness in the local 
population as to the allocation of government funds for repatriation also draws 
antipathy toward Kazakh immigrants. With the backdrop of the growing gap between 
the rich and the poor, the opinion that the interests of locals should be given preference 
over those of immigrants may continue to grow in the future. The amount of financial 
assistance to repatriates in Kazakhstan is rather modest in comparison with those 
given by the governments of Germany and Israel. Nevertheless, many locals feel that it 
is not fair that those who just arrived enjoy privileges not available for the local 
population who, they argue, remained in Kazakhstan even in difficult times and have 
contributed to the motherland for generations.  
Discontent with the state-sponsored ethnic return migration project 
notwithstanding, public protest against this policy has rarely occurred in Kazakhstan to 
date. This is because the invitation of co-ethnics from abroad was authorized within the 
framework of a decolonization project aimed at redressing the wrongs of the past and at 
reviving the Kazakh nation. Also, in the course of Kazakh-oriented state building 
process, non-Kazakh minorities in Kazakhstan rarely objected to the repatriation policy 
of the state. In the early 1990s there was strong criticism against the allowance of dual 
citizenship for Kazakh immigrants, but this criticism focused not on the return 
migration of Kazakhs per se, but on the fact that only ethnic Kazakhs were allowed to 
hold two passports (this dispute ended when the 1995 Constitution banned dual 
citizenship). Indeed, many minorities themselves left Kazakhstan for their ancestral 
homeland, if such opportunities were available.  
The absence of political forces against repatriation provides the ideal condition for 
its continuation and promotion. However, the invitation of ethnic Kazakhs from abroad 
lost its priority in the political agenda after the majority status of the titular ethnicity in 
Kazakhstan was regained. In recent years, the assistance to immigrants has become a 
social and economic burden to the government. It is unlikely, however, that the 
Kazakhstan government will completely abandon its ethnic return migration policy. 
Having defined itself as the state for all Kazakhs of the world, Kazakhstan has entitled 
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co-ethnics with the right of return to their ancestral homeland to become full-fledged 
citizens. If the government declares that the state cannot accept ethnic brethren any 
more, such a decision will surely invite severe criticism from Kazakh nationalists as 
well as immigrants, who will readily cast the ruling elites as traitors to the Kazakh 
nation. On the other hand, instability in the society will only grow worse if new 
immigrants continue to arrive while the integration of those who already have settled 
barely proceeds, and their social problems remain unsolved. Kazakhstan finds itself 
caught in a dilemma: because of its ethnic roots and de-colonization agenda, Kazakh 
repatriation policy cannot be easily abandoned even if it creates more problems than 
benefits. 
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